A war with no winners...

2026-03-10 - 21:52

It's not surprising that Trump, less than two weeks into the war, says it will be over 'very soon.' Oil prices soaring above $100 per barrel was the most significant trigger for this statement. The ambiguity of a military intervention he struggles to explain politically and entered into due to Israel's 'provocation' gives Trump flexibility in declaring victory, but this conflict, which the American people do not support, has no benefit other than generating political costs for him. At this stage, it's highly likely he will declare 'mission accomplished' and withdraw, but if he doesn't take lasting steps that change the fundamental dynamics of the conflict, America may have to get used to a perpetual war into which it will constantly be drawn. This destructive phase, representing the latest point in the regional struggle between Israel and Iran, also seems unlikely to result in a lasting agreement in the short term. If Iran adopts a maximalist position of continuing the war unless America completely withdraws from the region, it cannot bear the cost of an open-ended, perpetual war. It also seems unlikely that Israel will achieve its goal of completely neutralizing Iran. In this equation, if Trump declares victory and ends the war, Iran will also declare victory, but in this scenario, there will be no real winner of the war. The scenario where Iran is heavily wounded, Israel fails to completely eliminate Iran as a threat, and America fails to achieve regime change stands out as the most likely scenario. The Economic Cost The fastest and most deterrent effect of the war with Iran has been the sharp fluctuations it created in energy markets. The large-scale halt of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz pushed the price per barrel of oil above $100 as of Monday. Trump announced that the US government would provide insurance and military protection for transit ships, but implementing this quickly doesn't seem possible. Since Trump's war preparations focused on amassing troops in the region without preparing to minimize the economic consequences, this is a major problem. Insurance companies either don't want to insure oil tankers, or the policies are prohibitively expensive. Even if insurance were available, many shipping companies don't want to risk their vessels and crew. Although some transits through the strait are currently taking place, they are either very risky or unrecorded. Beyond oil, the security problem in the region also generates a very serious risk for liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets. Qatar halting its LNG production and exports due to Iranian drone strikes has hit European and Asian energy markets. This situation has increased demand for American LNG exports, but with America's limited capacity for expansion, it's impossible for it to fill Qatar's place. While European markets have seen increases of around 50%, price spikes reaching up to 100% in Asia have shaken energy markets. American LNG producers, the world's largest exporters, are benefiting from this situation, but the price volatility increases unpredictability and fragility in energy markets. The fact that the war did not begin with a Congressional decision forces the Trump administration to use the existing Pentagon budget. Although there is much conflicting and speculative news about the cost of the war, we know America has already spent billions of dollars. If the Trump administration continues the war at the same pace, requesting a supplementary budget from Congress will become inevitable. This would mean Congress declaring war, and consequently, Trump losing control over determining the war's fate. At a time when his job approval rating is at historically low levels, it doesn't seem possible for Trump to convince Congress to declare war and approve billions in new budget. The fluctuations in energy markets directly hitting the budgets of the American people, the negative outlook in the stock market, and the ever-increasing economic cost of the war are pushing Trump to declare victory as soon as possible. Who is Winning, Who is Losing? Looking at what America has gained, it's striking that Trump cannot find support to convince the American public of the need for high energy prices and economic costs. The public is already convinced this is Israel's war, not America's, and does not want to pay any more. Even if Congress supports it in the short term under the influence of the Israel lobby, passing a long-term war decision and allocating a budget would be political suicide. Seeing that the promised scenario of a quick victory and regime change, as Israel claimed, is not happening, Trump will have to settle for the claim of destroying Iran's military nuclear and ballistic missile capacity. It was known that Trump would declare victory regardless of the outcome, but the real question was at what stage he would do so. The conflict in June 2025 lasted 12 days; this war could last longer, but Trump already saying he has won indicates that stopping operations may not be far off. Facing America's so-called victory, it's not possible to say Iran has achieved a clear success either. It was largely clear that regime change would not be possible without a full-scale American invasion. Iran cannot be said to have succeeded in deterring America by generating significant economic and military costs. Iran, whose political leadership and military infrastructure have taken a heavy blow, has dealt a lasting blow to its relations with Gulf countries. Although it showed it could strike Israel, it made a strategic error by pushing its neighbors towards the US and Israel. By regionalizing the war, Iran has become regionally isolated, and the support it receives from Russia and China appears to be minimal. Even if it indirectly achieves US withdrawal through generating economic costs rather than military force, it's difficult to say this is a lasting gain in terms of regional power projection. As for Israel, although it succeeded in getting America to attack Iran, Trump's 'last chance' remark indicates that the Netanyahu government has dealt a lasting blow to the US-Israel relationship. Congressional support remaining at a partisan level shows how much the traditional bipartisan American support has eroded. An equation has emerged where it will be impossible to verify whether Iran's nuclear capacity has been destroyed, as Iran's future acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections will depend on major concessions. Iran's capacity to use its ballistic missiles has been significantly set back, but repairing this capacity in the medium term is possible. Israel ensured a major blow was struck against Iran, but it cannot claim to have ended the Iranian threat. It must also be added that regional countries—neither believing America will protect them against Iran nor trying to get along with Iran—have found what they hoped for. Looking at countries like Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, it's clear that major investments in the American security umbrella, occasional rapprochement with Israel, and efforts at outreach to Iran have largely failed. Gulf countries, unable to convince either America not to enter the war or Iran not to attack them, will have to turn towards a new security understanding. The negative impact of energy market volatility on their economies will also emerge as a critical challenge in the coming period. Looking at all these dynamics, it's not difficult to predict that this war will have no winner and that a new regional security balance will need to be established.