Ancient Neocons, American Neocons..

2026-03-23 - 22:59

In 416 BC, Athens demanded the unconditional surrender of the city-state of Melos, which had chosen to remain “neutral” in its wars against Sparta. As I mentioned in my previous article, the Melians did not accept and were subjected to a massacre. At that time, a fragile truce was in effect between Athens and Sparta. The architect of this truce was the Athenian General Nicias. But Alcibiades of Athens, who wanted to break the truce, had bigger plans. Alcibiades wanted Syracuse, the wealthy city-state in Sicily. For Alcibiades, the conquest of Sicily and Italy was the first link in a chain of “endless wars.” With the resources gained from conquering Sicily and Carthage, it would then be Sparta’s turn. Alcibiades dreamed of seizing Carthage and Libya in North Africa, then expanding the Athenian Empire as far as the Persian territories in Western Asia. Meanwhile, Egesta, the city-state hostile to Syracuse in Sicily, had sent multiple delegations to Athens to make the Sicilian expedition happen. Ambitious and glory-seeking Alcibiades was Egesta’s strongest supporter in the Athenian assembly. Nicias, on the other hand, argued that the resources to be allocated for an expedition provoked by Egesta should be spent for Athens itself. According to Nicias, Athens’ resources should be spent preparing for a potential war against Sparta. Nicias argued that if this expedition, so far from Athens, failed, it would push many city-states in Sicily, especially Syracuse, into an alliance with Sparta. Nicias, who argued that Egesta should not be trusted, pointed out that the “neocons” would drag Athens into a dangerous adventure. According to Nicias’ faction, the Sicilian expedition was a means of personal enrichment for Alcibiades, whose wealth was dwindling due to his lavish spending. Nicias, who maintained that the Egestaeans should handle their own affairs, warned that if the expedition succeeded, even more troops would be needed to maintain control in Sicily. Nicias, noting that the Egestaeans had not asked Athens for help in their earlier wars in Sicily, said: “Let us tell them to solve the problem on their own now. And from now on, let us not rush to help people who, when they are in trouble on their own behalf, will bring us no benefit even after we have assisted them.” Alcibiades, however, said he was confident that most of the city-states in Sicily would side with Athens against Syracuse. Alcibiades said: “The reason we ally with the Sicilians is not so that they come here and help us, but so that they protect us against our enemies there. If we do not go to war, if we listen to what Nicias says, maintaining our empire in the future will be a dream.” Alcibiades, who said, “If we want Athenian hegemony to spread, we must go and fight,” continued as follows: “We have two possibilities: either we establish our hegemony over all of Sicily, or at the very least we inflict serious damage on the Syracusans and thereby benefit both ourselves and our allies. Thanks to our navy, we will also decide whether to remain in Sicily. Even if all the cities of Sicily unite, sovereignty at sea will remain with us in any case.” Alcibiades had convinced the Athenian Assembly to undertake the Sicilian expedition. Nicias, however, took the podium once more to dissuade the Assembly, arguing that the Sicilian expedition would require far more troops and ships. Surprisingly, the Assembly accepted Nicias’ proposals. Moreover, Nicias was appointed by the Assembly as one of the three commanders of the expedition, alongside Alcibiades and General Lamachus. Thucydides’ histories contain further details about the Sicilian debates in the Athenian Assembly in 415 BC. For the main point, this much is sufficient. Thucydides says that the fleet prepared for the Sicilian expedition was the largest Greek naval force ever assembled. Alcibiades argued that Syracuse had no capacity to withstand the Athenian navy. According to Thucydides’ narrative, the young Athenians who gathered here and there were experiencing such a burst of overconfidence that they were picking out territories for themselves on maps of Sicily and North Africa. You must have noticed that the “Sicily debates” in Athens some 2,500 years ago resemble the debates concerning a U.S. attack on Iran. You can replace “Egesta first” and “Athens first” with “Israel first” and “America first.” I will describe in my next article how the Sicilian expedition, which the Athenian neocons launched expecting a “short” and “decisive victory,” ended up going awry.