The definition of victory in a war with Iran: military superiority or regime change?

2026-03-05 - 19:12

The severity of Iran's retaliation within the first 48 hours of the US-Israeli attack indicated that Israel and the Gulf countries were facing a significant cost. Iran's striking of Israel, targeting American bases in the Gulf, and effectively ending tanker traffic in the Strait of Hormuz signaled that the war was about to become regional. By demonstrating that it could continue fighting even if Khamenei and senior Iranian leadership were eliminated, Iran conveyed the message that it would not easily surrender to America and Israel. The regime, appearing prepared for a scenario where it could not operate under a central chain of command, showed its aim to broaden the war front as much as possible by decentralizing decision-making authority in a wartime environment. However, it can be said that this strategy necessitated that the war be managed not by a political will within a chain of command, but to the extent permitted by its military capacity. It is clear that this type of resistance strategy, while focused on exacting a cost and sustaining the regime, would not be sufficient to win the war. THE RESISTANCE STRATEGY America and Israel's seizure of air superiority over Iranian skies in the last few days, along with the intense operations they have carried out, indicates that Iran's capacity to target Israel and regional countries has significantly diminished. Interpreting the decrease in Iran's ballistic missile attacks as a tactical choice does not seem plausible, as there is no strong evidence that they are able to manage the war within a chain of command. The salvos in the first few days, which showed that Iran could threaten the entire region with its navy, air force, and ballistic missiles, appeared in the following days to be largely reduced to the use of its ballistic missile capacity scattered across the country's vast geography. America and Israel's domination of Iranian airspace and their substantial neutralization of its already limited navy resulted in the regime being confined to using its ballistic missile capacity. All of this suggests that American military power can gradually assert its superiority, but it is not possible to think this will be easy or quick. War is a process full of surprises, and the possibility that Iran might occasionally turn these dynamics to its own advantage always exists. However, the lack of a political and strategic mind to conduct the war, or its inability to organize itself to use its military capacity most effectively even if such a mind exists, stands out as Iran's biggest handicap. For example, by choosing to target American bases and some civilian targets in a way that would alienate Gulf countries in the first two days, it might have been more effective for Iran to expend all its energy on striking Israel. There may be logic in trying to deter America by hitting its military targets, but alienating the Gulf and other Arab countries in the process stands out as a critical mistake. Trying to deter America by attempting to give the message 'I will burn the entire region' upon entering an existential struggle does not appear to be a very rational strategy. PRESSURE FROM AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND CONGRESS Around 60% of the American public expresses opposition to a war with Iran. Despite this, a bill attempting to limit Trump's military intervention against Iran was rejected in the Senate vote concluded on Thursday evening. The vote, in which both parties lost only one member each, showed that Republicans are not willing to stand up to Trump. The gap between the American people and American politics was starkly evident during the genocide in Gaza, and the latest Iran vote indicates this chasm is deepening. The fact that even MAGA figures, who most vocally defend Trump in the media, are clearly against the war, yet Congressional Republicans adopt this stance, shows both their support for the President and the continued influence of the pro-Israel lobby. Although entering a potentially prolonged war with Iran poses a risk of losing voter support for Trump, who came to power by winning votes with anti-war rhetoric, it is clear he has the backing of the pro-Israel influence in Congress. Scenarios such as the war with Iran dragging on, regime change not occurring, being forced to send in ground troops, and oil prices rising further would drive Trump's approval ratings even lower. However, even in that case, the effectiveness of the Israel lobby in Congressional dynamics could ensure that Washington politics remains on Trump's side. The political cost of this would be losing one or both chambers of Congress in the November elections. Trump, wanting to conclude military operations within the next month or two, is trying to formulate a way to declare a political victory. The most important condition for this would be Iran no longer being able to launch ballistic missile attacks. The longer Iran can delay reaching that stage, the more public pressure on Trump will increase. However, it is certain that this will not be enough for America to end the war, as Israel will continue to use all its influence over Congress. Even if he were to lose one chamber of Congress, assuming that Trump, who ultimately does not have reelection concerns, wants to end the war as soon as possible would be a miscalculation. Iran appears to have no deterrent option left beyond increasing the cost of the war for America and Israel. The US Congress, despite public opinion, has signaled its willingness to bear this cost. Despite America's difficulty in defining its military objective and its ambiguous stance on regime change, it has the capacity to break Iran's power of resistance. However, neutralizing the navy, establishing air superiority, and diminishing ballistic missile capabilities will not be enough to topple the regime. For that, the Iranian people would need to mobilize, but the American side does not seem to have given much thought to the political preparation for this. If it attempts to overthrow the regime by mobilizing the PJAK and fomenting ethnic and sectarian conflict, the specter of civil war looms; if it puts American boots on the ground, scenarios similar to what happened in Iraq come to the fore. This indicates that while America and Israel can establish military superiority by bearing a high cost, achieving political change would be far more difficult.